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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1979-1980
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. The title of this symposium has been changed from The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the Term to Developments in the Law to
reflect expanded coverage of legislative amendments in Louisiana and of federal
statutes and decisions of interest to the Louisiana lawyer. However, the symposium




HOLDER IN DUE COURSE STATUS
Federal Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) concluded in November of
1975, after reviewing a public record of more than 2,000 pages of
testimony and 700 pages of written submissions generated by two
and one-half years of public proceedings, that it constitutes an "un-
fair and deceptive practice" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) for sellers of consumer goods or services (affecting interstate
commerce) to utilize contract stipulations or contract forms that
separate the consumer's duty to pay for such goods or services from
the seller's reciprocal duty to perform as promised. The typical
situation at which the FTC took aim was the transfer of a negotiable
promissory note by the seller to a holder in due course whose status
as such permitted the cutoff of the buyer's claims and defenses.' To
remedy the perceived unfairness and deception,2 the FTC in 1975
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 10:3-305 (Supp. 1974).
2. The FTC had long felt that it was unfair and deceptive for sellers to fail to
warn consumers that the contracts signed by them would be sold to third parties who
(by virtue of holder in due course status or as beneficiary of a "waiver of claims and
defenses" clause) might be permitted to enforce the consumer's obligation without
regard to claims and defenses. See 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973); Note, The FTC Proposed
Rule and the Holder in Due Course, 18 S. DAK. L. REV. 516 (1973). The Commission
presumably would say that it is unfair to separate the parties' reciprocal obligations to
perform, and deceptive to do so by use of a sophisticated commercial document with
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produced a Trade Regulation Rule' requiring the presence of a
prescribed preservation of claims and defenses clause on all con-
sumer contracts.
4
the legal niceties of which the consumer is not likely to be acquainted.
The National Commission on Consumer Finance, in its 1972 report on consumer
credit, included among its recommendations that third party holders of contracts and
other evidences of indebtedness should be subject to all claims and defenses of the
consumer-debtor arising out of the transaction-in short, the abolition of holder in due
course protection in consumer contracts. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES, xvii
& 34-38 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office Stock No. 5200-00005, December, 1972).
3. The FTC had previously assumed the power to make substantive "trade
regulation rules" to enhance its ability to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive
trade practices, but the Commission had been challenged on this point. See National
Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd,
482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). When the district court
in National Petroleum Ref. had refused to recognize the power asserted by the FTC,
the Congress initiated action to enlarge the statutory authority of the Commission; the
United States Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the decision of the district
court, siding with the Commission. The Congressional initiative culminated in the FTC
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57(a) (1979), which gave to the Commission the power
to make substantive trade regulation rules. The Act, however, expressly revokes the
nonlegislative power asserted by the Commission in the National Petroleum Ref.
litigation. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57(a)(2) (1979).
4. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1979). Technically, the Rule makes it an "unfair or deceptive
practice" within the meaning of section 5 of the FTC Act for a seller, directly or in-
directly, to take or receive a "consumer credit contract" which fails to contain the
FTC's required clause:
NOTICE-
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO
ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT
HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER
BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER
or to accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the proceeds of any pur-
chase money loan (as defined), unless any consumer credit contract made in connection
with such purchase money loan contains the following provision:
NOTICE-
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO
ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
"Consumer credit contract" is defined under the Rule as an instrument which
evidences or embodies a debt arising from a cash advance received by a consumer (a
natural person who seeks or acquires goods or services for person, family, or
household use) in return for "finance charge" (within the meaning of Truth in Lending
and Regulation Z), and which is applied in whole or in part, to a purchase of goods or
services from a seller who refers consumers to, or is affiliated or has a "business ar-
rangement" with the lender; or a debt arising from an extension of sale credit within
the meaning of Truth in Lending and Regulation Z, if seller, in the ordinary course of
business, sells or leases goods or services to consumers. See 41 Fed. Reg. 34594-97
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The Rule, entitled "Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses," immediately raised three questions of interest to law-
yers: 1) Does the presence of the FTC clause in an otherwise
negotiable writing preclude holder status-and therefore holder in
due course status'-by destroying the negotiable character6 of the
(Aug. 16, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 20022-27 (May 14, 1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 53506-30 (Nov. 18,
1975).
5. It is pursuant to R.S. 10:3-305 that a holder in due course is afforded protec-
tion from the claims and defenses of the maker, and it is pursuant to R.S. 10:3-302,
3-303, and 3-304 that the status of holder in due course is attained. Each of the
referenced sections concerns a "holder," a status acquired by a third party only
through the process of "negotiation" described in R.S. 10:3-202(1). All of the sections
mentioned require the presence of an "instrument," which for purposes of those sec-
tions means a negotiable instrument. LA. R.S. 10:3-102(1)(e) & 3-104 (Supp. 1974); Lein-
inger v: Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1977). Thus, one cannot be the "holder" (and
therefore not the "holder in due course") of an evidence of indebtedness that is not in
negotiable form under R.S. 10:3-104.
6. A plausible argument can be constructed that the FTC clause conditions the
maker's undertaking, thereby destroying the negotiable character of the writing under
R.S. 10:3-104(1)(b). The following cases would be helpful to the argument: American
Sur. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 29 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Mo. 1939) (a
memorandum that is more than a mere notation on the check or note and which con-
stitutes a limitation or a restriction on payment destroys negotiability; but words such
as "in full payment" are merely notations of receipt of payment, not intended to limit
or condition payment); Jennings v. First Nat'l Bank, 13 Colo. 417, 22 Pac. 777 (1889)
(note "not to be paid unless I have the use of said premises," held nonnegotiable);
Farmers' State Bank of Cuba v. Blazek, 115 Kan. 178, 222 Pac. 748 (1924) (promissory
writing bearing on its face the words, "subject to purchase Cuba Elevator" was condi-
tional and nonnegotiable); Robbins v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 169 Tenn. 507, 89 S.W.2d 340
(1936) (an otherwise negotiable note for payment of rent was held to have been
rendered nonnegotiable by a state statute exonerating a lessee from liability for rent
where the leased premises are destroyed or so damaged as to be unfit for occupancy);
Hight v. McCulloch, 150 Tenn. 117, 263 S.W. 794 (1924) (provision in rent note, stating
"this note void in case the property is destroyed before maturity" conditioned the
maker's promise, rendering the note nonnegotiable); Anderson v. Bing, 244 S.W.2d 187
(Tenn. App. 1951) (earnest money check reciting on its face "check to be returned if
deal is not consummated" was not negotiable); Embry v. Federal Credit Bureau, 39
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (note provision requiring notice to maker of assign-
ment destroyed negotiability). Thus, the FTC clause can be seen as making the con-
sumer's note a declaration that, although he has promised to pay, he has not promised
to pay in all events, under all circumstances. Cf. Hull v. Angus, 60 Ore. 95, 118 Pac.
284, 286 (1911) (involving a note made conditional by a "subject to" clause). But the
FTC could simply have required the word "nonnegotiable" on all consumer contracts, if
nonnegotiability was desired. See Henry v. Cobb Bank & Trust Co., 261 S.E.2d 459
(Ga. App. 1979). Moreover, no note is ever completely unconditional, because implicit in
every promise to pay is the caveat, "unless, of course, I have been discharged in
bankruptcy, or am declared to have been mentally incompetent on this date, or you
have committed on me a 'real' fraud." To expressly state such implicit caveats would
do no damage to negotiability, but of course the FTC language arguably goes beyond
the express statement of an implicit condition, for the consumer today is warning the
payee and all others that he is promising to pay "unless I have a claim or defense," or
1981]
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writing, or, does the clause simply constitute a stipulation that af-
fects liability, but not negotiable character, in the manner of stipula-
tions such as those pertaining to solidarity, waiver of presentment,
place of presentment, and effect of indorsements?; 2) What is the
result when the clause is mistakenly inserted into an otherwise
negotiable writing that is not a "consumer contract"?;7 and 3) What
is the result when the clause is omitted from an otherwise
negotiable consumer contract? The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in
Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Stamatiou, has, in one of the first
cases in the nation to address these issues, offered a thoughtful and
correct analysis.
The maker in Stamatiou signed a promissory note in connection
with his purchase of a truck to be used in his business.9 Neither the
"Sale and Chattel Mortgage" nor the promissory note affixed
thereto" indicated the buyer's intended use of the truck, and despite
the absence of any requirement that he do so, the seller had utilized
a form containing the FTC clause." The seller assigned the contract
to Jefferson Bank, and when the buyer refused to make payments
(because of certain alleged redhibitory vices of the truck), litigation
followed. In that litigation, Jefferson Bank sought holder in due
course protection.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved the holder in due
course issue against the bank, making the following points: 1) The
FTC clause in a non-consumer contract cannot be treated as merely
informational verbiage, but must be treated as a stipulation carrying
potentially important legal consequences; 2) Despite the fact that
the clause appeared in the contract only in deference to assumed
federal penalties for noncompliance, 2 the clause became part of the
contract and had, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the effect
of law on the parties; 3) While as between seller and buyer there
"subject to my ability to avoid payment by the assertion of a claim or defense." A
negotiable note without the FTC clause carries the opposite connotation, to wit, "I
promise to pay a holder in due course despite the existence of claims or defenses I
might have against the payee."
7. See note 4, supra.
8. 384 So. 2d 388 (La. 1980).
9. The opinion does not suggest that the buyer disputed the allegation that his
intended purpose was commercial rather than for "personal, family or household use,"
although a fact issue ordinarily would be generated. See Lacey v. Baywood Truck &
Mach., 381 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
10. The parties signed one instrument, embodying both a "Sale and Chattel Mort-
gage," and a "Promissory Note," with no perforated line separating the two, and no
other indication that the note was likely to be separated and enforced separately. 384
So. 2d at 389 n.1.
11. See note 4, supra.
12. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m) (1979).
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may have been a mistake regarding the inclusion of the clause, the
bank nevertheless could not have reasonably expected to acquire
holder in due course status, given the presence of the clause on the
face of the contract. The supreme court thus characterized the FTC
clause as simply a federally mandated stipulation whereby a buyer
and seller agree, consistent with R.S. 10:1-102(3), to vary the effect
of R.S. 10:3-305."3 To so construe the effect of the FTC clause on the
writing permits the writing to be characterized as "negotiable" for
all purposes except holder in due course status. Had the court held
negotiability to have been destroyed by the FTC clause, possessors
of such contracts would also be denied the protection of R.S.
10:3-414,"4 and that of R.S. 10:3-417(2)."
While the effect of construing the FTC clause as merely an
agreement by the parties to vary the effect of R.S. 10:3-305 will be
to deny a third party holder the advantages of holder in due course
status, the clause itself affords the buyer no greater substantive or
procedural rights than he otherwise would have under state law.
Thus, while the buyer may assert his claim in redhibition or his
defense of seller nonperformance against the holder of the contract,
neither the FTC clause nor the Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses Rule itself in any manner aids the consumer in prov-
ing necessary ultimate facts. An example of the effect of the Rule is
seen in the recent case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Daniels,"6 involving a consumer automobile sale contract bearing the
FTC clause. The buyer's dissatisfaction with the automobile led him
to withhold the monthly payments, which in turn led to the filing by
the creditor of a petition for executory process. The buyer, assert-
13. The'ability of the parties to vary the effect of the provisions of title 10 of the
Revised Statutes is discussed in Hersbergen, The Bank Customer Relationship Under
the Louisiana Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REV. 29 (1975).
14. An indorser, such as the seller in Stamatiou, engages to pay the tenor of the
instrument to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up; if the writing
had been characterized as "nonnegotiable," there would be no "holder," and in fact, no
"indorsement." See LA. R.S. 10:3-202 (Supp. 1974). Cf. C. NORTON, HAND-BOOK OF THE
LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES, § 57, 106 (2d ed. 1896) ("An indorsement is classed by itself
as a distinct body of contract rights and liabilities. It has its origin in and is confined
to the Theory of Negotiability."); Bryant v. McGowan, 151 Pa. Super. 529, 30 A.2d 667
(1943); Young v. Sehon, 53 W. Va. 127, 44 S.E. 136 (1903) ("The words 'indorser' and 'in-
dorsement' as used in connection with the [liability] assumed by one merely writing his
name on the back of the instrument, are technical words, applied only to negotiable
paper.")
15. Under R.S. 10:3-417(2) Jefferson Bank would be the recipient of an implied
warranty from the seller-transferor of the note that "no defense of any party is good
against him," only if the transfer has been of an "instrument," i.e., a "negotiable in-
strument." See LA. R.S. 10:3-102(1)(e) (Supp. 1974).
16. 377 So. 2d 346 (La. 1979).
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ing the pendency of an action in redhibition instituted by him
against the seller in another judicial district, filed in the executory
proceeding a petition for preliminary injunction to prevent a
sheriffs seizure and sale of the vehicle. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana conceded that in the absence of the FTC clause, a debtor
could not assert an action in redhibition as the basis of enjoining ex-
ecutory proceeding instituted by a holder in due course, but denied
the buyer's petition for preliminary injunction as unsupported by
any showing that the redhibition action on which the preliminary in-
junction petition was premised was a meritorious action, under ar-
ticles 3601 through 3609 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
By utilizing a contract form that does bear the FTC clause, the
parties are ostensibly characterizing the transaction as a consumer
transaction. The recent federal court decision in International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Evans7 indicates that the presence of the
FTC clause will not per se bring the transaction within the state's
consumer credit laws. That is, the inclusion of the clause does not
constitute an agreement by the pai'ties that the transaction is to be
governed by, for example, the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law. 8
By analyzing the effect of the FTC clause from a contract or
"agreement to vary" point of view, the supreme court's Stamatiou
decision implicitly suggests that where the consumer signs an other-
wise negotiable writing that should, but does not, contain the clause,
a transferee or assignee will have the ability to prove holder in due
course status. Of course, the holder of the contract can always at-
tempt to show that the transaction is not a consumer transaction, as
happened in Lacey v. Baywood Truck & Machinery,9 a recent deci-
sion from Louisiana's First Circuit Court of Appeal. Several recent
decisions involving analogous fact patterns support the view that
the consumer contract that does not bear the required clause will be
treated the same as a non-consumer contract. Many states have en-
acted section 2.403 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, a provi-
sion which prohibits the seller or lessor in a consumer credit trans-
action from taking a negotiable instrument (other than a check) as
evidence of the obligation." Section 2.403 adds that a holder is not a
holder in due course if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice
that it is (or has been) issued in violation of the section. Section
2.403 and the FTC Preservation Rule thus have a similarity in ap-
17. 484 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
18. Id. at 3; LA. R.S. 9:3514 (Supp. 1972). The United States District Court in
Evans felt that the mere inclusion of the FTC clause did not sufficiently evidence an
intent of the parties to make their transaction subject to the consumer credit laws.
19. 381 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
20. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:3532(B) (Supp. 1972) (home solicitation sales).
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proach: the burden of violation of the law is placed on the seller or
lessor, not on the assignee creditor. In several cases, such creditors
have been permitted to attempt to prove holder in due course status
with respect to an evidence of indebtedness issued in violation of
the prohibition of section 2.403.21
It would be misleading to conclude that "business as usual" will
successfully guide the holder of a consumer contract that does not
bear the FTC clause in his quest for holder in due course status, for
although the contract will probably be negotiable, and the tradi-
tional legal standard-R.S. 10:3-305-will be applied, the road to sec-
tion 3-305 must still~pass through an intersecting section: 3-302(1)(b);
that section could prevent acquisition of holder in due course status
in a "clause-less" consumer contract case. Holder in due course
status tends to be irrelevant in the absence of a claim or defense by
the maker;22 assume then, that a claim or defense does exist in favor
of the consumer buyer who has signed a contract not bearing the re-
quired clause: to the extent that the contract is in negotiable form,
the traditional ideas of good faith and lack of notice of claims and
defenses would dictate holder in due course status in most cases.
Certainly sections 3-302(1)(c) and 3-304 have not traditionally been
applied to deny holder in due course status unless the holder not
only knew when he acquired the instrument that it was issued in
return for an executory promise, but also knew or had notice that a
defense or claim had actually arisen,23 or unless the instrument itself
was "so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms or
ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay."2 Thus,
the holder today can know that the transaction underlying the
clause-less instrument may give rise to a defense or claim, and he
still will be a holder in due course. Good faith, however, is also a
prerequisite of holder in due course status, and that requirement
most likely will be applied so as to defeat holder in due course
status in cases involving nonlabelled consumer contracts.
At first glance, the requirement of good faith would not seem to
pose a significant hurdle for the holder of a clause-less consumer
contract in that the requirement expressly calls for no more than
subjective honesty in fact.25 But the subjective standard has not
21. Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976); Circle v. Jim
Walter Homes, Inc., 535 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1976); Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-
Buick-GMC, Inc., 366 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1978). See Pitts v. Henley, 384 So. 2d 1105 (Ala.
App. 1980); Jefferson v. Mitchell Select Furn. Co., Inc., 321 So. 2d 216 (Ala. App. 1975).
22. See Thrift Credit Corp. v. American Overseas Trading Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d
930, 54 A.D. 2d 994 (1976).
23. LA. R.S. 10:3-304(4)(b) (Supp. 1974).
24. LA. R.S. 10:3-304(1)(a) (Supp. 1974).
25. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974) (definition of "good faith").
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always been rigorously applied to cases involving consumer in-
struments, and has, in fact, earned the title of one of "the most slip-
pery concepts" in the Uniform Commercial Code." Thus, if one as-
sumes that most consumer contracts that are assigned or transfered
will be held by a commercially sophisticated institutional creditor,
who knows or should know that the national public policy of the
United States calls for the protection of consumers through a pre-
servation of claims and defenses stipulation requirement on all con-
sumer contracts affecting interstate commerce (and who, in the exer-
cise of prudent business judgment will know a great deal about the
general nature of the business of the -seller he finances, and most
probably the specific goods purchased in the transaction in
question), that creditor will not be in good faith whenever he ac-
quires, without inquiry or investigation, a consumer contract not
bearing the required stipulation. 7
26. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 17-3, at 563 (1972). A discussion of the issue of good faith under the Loui-
siana Commercial Laws may be found in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1975-1976 Term- Commercial Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections, 37 LA.
L. REV. 406, 414-16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Term].
The relationship between good faith and notice of defenses and claims is a close
one. For example, if the provisions of R.S. 10:3-304(1)(2) or (3) apply, the holder can be
denied holder in due course status either on the basis of notice of claims and defenses
(or overdueness), or on the basis of lack of good faith. Good faith would be the more
general of the two requirements. See LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (Supp. 1974). For example, a
holder might be without "notice" of a claim or defense with respect to a particular in-
strument, but be in bad faith because he knows that numerous of the seller-payee's
other instruments have in the past given rise to defenses and claims.
27. Most courts would agree with the following assessment of good faith, offered
in Stewart v. Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 110, 568 P.2d 414, 417 (1977):
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. It en-
tails the absence of bad faith and bad faith is dishonesty and absence of fidelity to
the obligations of morals and honor. Bad faith is not just being careless. It is guilty
knowledge or wilful ignorance .... To defeat the title of one otherwise a holder in
due course who does not have knowledge of an infirmity or defect, there must be
actual bad faith. Yet carelessness and failure to inquire under certain cir-
cumstances may constitute bad faith and it has been held that gross carelessness
may constitute evidence of bad faith.
Among the numerous decisions finding bad faith in the acquistion of a consumer note
or contract, or in cases relevant thereto, the following are exemplary: Stewart v.
Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 568 P.2d 414 (1977) (holder charged with knowledge of the re-
quirement of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act that a land purchaser may
revoke within forty-eight hours where the purchaser has received a required property
report less than forty-eight hours before he signed the contract of sale, yet holder did
not inquire as to such matters; held, bad faith could reasonably have been inferred by
the trial judge); Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967)
(purchaser of note not in good faith where it was aware of the bad reputation of the
payee and purchased the note as a part of a package of approximately 480 such in-
struments at a discount of over 80%); Frye v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Cape
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Because the FTC Rule merely leaves the consumer free to
assert whatever claims and defenses he has under local law, sellers
and financers might well attempt to enhance the value of the con-
sumer paper with which they deal by utilizing a waiver or renuncia-
tion of redhibition clause. Such a waiver clause was, in fact, a
feature of the contract in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Daniels.28 The response of the Louisiana Supreme Court was in the
form of a reminder that three elements must exist before a valid
waiver of implied warranty can be found: the waiver must be writ-
ten in clear and unambiguous language, contained in the mortgage
or other key transactional document, and either brought to the at-
tention of the purchaser or explained to him.29 The rigorous applica-
tion of that three-part test has been detailed in a previous sym-
Girardeau, 561 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. App. 1977) (holder not in good faith where it knew that
the instrument taken was payment for a note which represented the personal obliga-
tion of an officer of the corporate maker, and knew, or is held to know, that personal
obligations of a corporate officer cannot ordinarily be paid with corporate funds);
General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971) (holder not in good
faith in taking a home improvement contract, where holder was fully familiar with
assignor's business and the terms of the contracts he used, among which terms was a
stipulation that payments were due only after sixty days following completion of the
project in a workmanlike manner, and holder neither inquired as to completion nor re-
quested a certificate of completion which he must have known was required under
New Jersey laws pertaining to home repair contracts, but relied solely on representa-
tions of the assignor). See generally Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer
Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1966).
The Official Comment to section 2.403 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCC), (see text at notes 20-21 supra,) indicates the view that the UCC prohibition
against use of negotiable instruments in consumer transactions will become known in
the financial community, so that professional financers would thereby not usually
qualify as holders in due course. However, in Circle v. Jim Walters Homes, Inc., 535
F.2d 583, 587 (10th Cir. 1976), the court noted that a holder could nevertheless make
the necessary showing of subjective good faith. See Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-
Buick-GMC, Inc., 366 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1978). The most telling point is made in Jefferson
v. Mitchell Select Furn. Co., Inc., 321 So. 2d 216 (Ala. App. 1975), in which it is said of
an instrument taken in violation of UCC section 2.403:
Though directing the consumer credit seller not to take negotiable paper,
other than a check, as evidence of the obligation of the purchaser, [section 2.4031
protects a holder in due course if such should be taken. Of course, it is difficult to
conceive how one could be a holder of a negotiable instrument which showed that
it was taken in the credit sale of consumer merchandise with retention of title and
a purchase money security interest, without knowledge that it arose from a [con-
sumer credit code] transaction.
Id. at 220. In short, the question becomes: is the holder believable when he says, "I
didn't realize that the seller had, in this instance, entered into a consumer
transaction"? See 1975-1976 Term, supra note 26, at 414-16.
28. See text at note 16, supra.
29. 377 So. 2d 346, 347-48 n.2.
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posium contribution;" it is sufficient to observe that a contract
which states both that the holder is subject to "all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller,"'" and that
the debtor waives the most important of the potential claims or
defenses he might have, is a candidate for a ruling of ambiguity.32
No doubt worthy of note in this context is the prohibition against
waivers of implied warranties under the federal Consumer Product
Warranties ("Magnuson-Moss") Act.3
The Preservation of Consumers' Claim and Defenses Rule, as
promulgated in 1975, applied to two classes of consumer transac-
tions: credit sales and leases of goods or services, and "purchase
money loan" transactions for the financing of such sales and leases."
In the former category, a seller is prohibited under the Rule from
using or taking a consumer credit contract not containing the re-
quired clause; in the latter category, the seller is prohibited from ac-
cepting, as full or partial payment for a consumer credit sale or
lease, the proceeds of any loan obtained by the consumer that is a
"purchase money loan," unless the consumer credit contract made in
connection with the loan contains a substantially similar clause."
The Rule was addressed solely to the merchant; the "purchase
money" lender was not affected. The FTC has recently approved "in
substance" an amendment" to the 1975 Rule that would, among
other things, extend the Rule to cover an "affiliated" lender,37 mak-
ing the lender liable to FTC sanctions if the promissory note it
employs does not bear the required clause, when the lender knows
30. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Con-
sumer Protection, 40 LA. L. REv. 619, 619-23 (1980).
31. See note 4, supra.
32. Cf. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Stamatiou, 384 So. 2d 388, 391 (La. 1980) (in-
sertion of the FTC clause into a nonconsumer contract can be viewed as ambigious).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
34. See note 4, supra.
35. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1980). See generally Hodge, A Primer on the FTC's Rule
Preserving Consumer Claims and Defenses, 11 U.C.C.L.J. 354, 357-59 (1979). See note
4, supra.
36. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65771-74 (Nov. 15, 1979). The amendment had been proposed
in November of 1975.
37. By "affiliation" the Rule intends a consideration of common control, or ex-
press or tacit business arrangements for the purpose of financing sales to consumers.
See 41 Fed. Reg. 20022, 20026 (1976).
Banks regulated by the Federal Reserve System are not directly affected by FTC
Trade Regulation Rules, but under the FTC Improvement Act, see note 3, supra, the
FRB must implement the same rules as the FTC, unless the FRB can establish a good
reason to exempt banks. Because the FTC amendment relies in part on FRB recom-
mendations, there is no reason to suppose that banks will be exempted.
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or should know that the purpose of the loan is to finance a purchase
from an affiliated seller. 8
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Payor Bank Accountability
Prompt handling of items in bank channels is a major theme of
Chapter 4 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws. The ordinary care re-
quired of a collecting bank39 in presenting or sending an item for
presentment, and in sending notice of dishonor or returning an item,
is measured by the concept of the "midnight deadline.""0 When a de-
mand item is presented for payment to a payor bank,"1 the payor
bank likewise must act on it promptly. If the payor bank makes an
authorized settlement for an item it has received (otherwise than
"over the counter") before midnight of the banking day of receipt,
R.S. 10:4-301(1) permits the payor bank to revoke the settlement and
recover any payment it has made, if it so acts before it has made
final payment" and before its midnight deadline.3 If it retains the
item beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt without so set-
tling for it, or if after settlement it does not "pay or return the item
or send notice of dishonor" until after its midnight deadline, the
payor bank is accountable for the amount of the item." With such
important consequences confronting the payor bank, certainty as to
the requirements of the law would be desirable, to say the least;
such certainty is hampered by conflicting case law and by the effect
on the Commercial Laws of "Regulation J." 5
Under R.S. 10:4-302(a), a payor bank avoids accountability by set-
tling for the item promptly and by observing the statutory com-
mand to "pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor" prior to
38. The amendment would continue to make the affiliated seller liable to FTC
sanctions if it accepts the proceeds of a loan from an affiliated lender when it knows
the consumer obtained the loan from an affiliated lender, and the required clause was
not included in the promissory note.
39. LA. R.S. 10:4-105(d) (Supp. 1974).
40. LA. R.S. 10:4-202(1) & (2); 4-104(h) (Supp. 1974).
41. LA. R.S. 10:4-105(b) (Supp. 1974).
42. LA. R.S. 10:4-213(1) (Supp. 1974).
43. LA. R.S. 10:4-301(1) (Supp. 1974). The section continues the "deferred posting"
practice permitted by former R.S. 6:67 & 68.
44. LA. R.S. 10:4-302 (Supp. 1974). The accountability of a payor bank under sec-
tion 4-302 is for the amount of the item; but the responsibility of a collecting bank for
failure to use ordinary care (usually meaning seasonable action) in handling an item
under section 4-202 presents a matter of proof of damages, whatever be the "amount of
the item." See Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Iowa,
1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1978); LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5) (Supp. 1974).
45. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1980).
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its midnight deadline. For dishonored items, then, section 4-302 ap-
pears to give the payor bank the option of returning the item or
sending notice of its dishonor as the means of avoiding accountabil-
ity. But under R.S. 10:4-301(1) a payor bank's ability to revoke a pro-
visional settlement with the presenting bank depends on the return
of the item before final payment and before the midnight deadline;
sending notice of dishonor can only take the place of a return of the
item if the item "is held for protest or is otherwise unavailable for
return." The rule of thumb for the payor bank must be "return the
item," rather than send notice of dishonor.46 Yet, a Federal Reserve
operating letter or circular authorizing telephonic notice can super-
sede the effect of section 4-301, as pointed out in the recent Wells
Fargo Bank v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Company 7 decision
from Connecticut, so that a payor bank's telephonic notice of nonpay-
ment on a Friday to a collecting bank created for the collecting bank
a midnight deadline of Monday for the giving of its own notice of
dishonor, rather than a midnight deadline based on the day it actu-
ally received the returned item. In fact, a bank required to "wire ad-
vice of nonpayment" under the Federal Reserve operating circular
must do so even where it has actually returned the item pursuant to
R.S. 10:4-301; compliance with section 4-301 is, however, necessary to
avoid accountability for the item.48
Regulation J is not just the concern of nationally chartered
banks. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 1974 held that
any bank which utilizes the check collection facilities of the Federal
Reserve System by magnetic encoding of checks becomes subject to
46. See United States v. Loskocinski, 403 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Blake v.
Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1977). R.S. 10:3-508 and 3-511,
which arguably permit a different result in that a bank seemingly may give a written
or even an oral notice of dishonor and be excused from any "notice" requirement, are
rendered inapplicable to the issues of the revocation of settlements and accountability
of payor banks by R.S. 10:4-102(1). Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Bank of
Utah, 538 P.2d 298 (Utah 1975). Contra, Security Trust Co. of New York v. First Nat'l
Bank of Rochester, 358 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Of course, a collecting bank or a
bank handling a collection item such as a "payable through" draft, is not acting as a
"payor bank" and consequently is not affected by sections 4-301 and 4-302, but would
be governed by section 3-508.
47. 484 F. Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1980) (construing Federal Reserve Operating Cir-
cular No. 6, 17(c), September 1, 1967). See Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Shawnee, 554 P.2d 119 (Okla. App. 1976) (construing operating
Letter No. 3, dated July 1, 1974, issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City);
LA. R.S. 10:4-103 (Supp. 1974). Operating circulars are issued by Federal Reserve
Banks under the authority of Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210.16 (1980).
48. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 F. Supp. 1366 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
A failure to return the item, and a failure to wire advice of nonpayment before the
midnight deadline would result in liability for the face amount of the item.
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Regulation J.4" The importance of Regulation J goes well beyond the
matter of handling dishonored items. A bank subject to Regulation J
can, for example, revoke a settlement prior to its midnight deadline
only if it settled for the item before the close of the banking day of
receipt."
In general, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, exercising regulatory power delegated by Congress, has at-
tempted to conform Federal Reserve banking regulations to the
Uniform Commercial Code. But Regulation J does preempt the Com-
mercial Code in the case of a direct conflict, such as was presented
in Colonial Cadillac, Inc. v. Shawmut Merchants Bank, N.A."1 There,
a dishonored $7,300 draft left a payee wondering if the depositary
bank and the Federal Reserve Bank had given timely notice of dis-
honor. As a collecting bank, the Federal Reserve Bank is an agent
or subagent of the owner of the item and must use ordinary care
(usually meaning "midnight deadline") in sending notice of dishonor
under R.S. 10:4-201, 4-202; as such, the bank could be liable to the
payee-owner under the U.C.C. Under Regulation J., however, a
Federal Reserve bank's liability is limited to those who "send" items
to the Reserve banks. 2 Applying favorably to the Federal Reserve
bank the test for preemption outlined by the Supreme Court,5 3 the
Massachusetts district court ruled that Regulation J preempted
U.C.C. sections 4-201(1) and 4-202(1), with which it was in direct con-
flict on the issue of the liability of the bank; because the payee was
not the "sender"54 of the item, no claim for relief could be stated and
the bank's motion to dismiss therefor was granted.
Approximately 25 billion checks are collected each year through
the bank collection process, of which only one-half of one percent are
dishonored upon presentment.5 Of those checks dishonored upon in-
49. Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 500 F.2d 282 (9th
Cir. 1974), modified, 525 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974).
50. 12 C.F.R. 210.9(a) (1979).
51. 488 F. Supp. 283 (D. Mass. 1980).
52. 16 C.F.R. § 210.6 (1980). Section 210.2(e) defines a "sender" as "a member
bank, a nonmember clearing bank, a Federal Reserve bank, an international organiza-
tion or a foreign correspondent."
53. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), applied in Doctors Hosp.,
Inc. v. Silva Recio, 558 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1977).
54. See note 52, supra. When the "owner" of the item is also the "sender" of the
item to the Federal Reserve bank, there is no conflict between Regulation J and the
U.C.C.; but when the owner is a remote party, as would typically be the case, a conflict
is presented.
55. Based on 1972 figures reported in Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, 500 F.2d 282, 284 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 525 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S 1089 (1974). See Leary, Check Handling Under Article
Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 331, 333 n.7 (1965).
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itial presentment, about one-half are paid upon re-presentment.6 Al-
though low in relation to total volume, the number of checks placed
in bank collection channels for re-presentment is quite significant,
and the proper handling of the re-presented check is a matter about
which courts do not agree. The disagreement concerns whether a re-
presented check is to be handled by the payor bank as if it were any
other check, with the midnight deadline setting the time limit for
return upon dishonor, or whether the midnight deadline is somehow
inapplicable to the re-presented check. The stakes are high: to inac-
curately predict the approach of the Louisiana courts could mean ac-
countability under R.S. 10:4-302 for the payor bank that retains a re-
presented check beyond the midnight deadline. The better view is
that the re-presented check is in no way distinguishable from other
checks, so that a payor bank's accountability is avoided only by a
return of the check prior to the midnight deadline. 8
56. Leary, supra note 55.
57. Compare Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita, 202 Kan. 450, 450
P.2d 1 (1969), and Goodman v. Norman Bank of Commerce, 551 P.2d 661 (Okla. App.
1976) (payor bank not required to send notice of dishonor of, or return, the re-
presented check before the midnight deadline) with Wiley v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co., 438 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971), Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589
(Ky. App. 1977), and Sun River Cattle Co. v. Miners Bank of Montana, 164 Mont. 237,
521 P.2d 679 (1974) (midnight deadline applicable to re-presented check). See David
Graubart, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 48 N.Y.2d 554, 399 N.E. 2d 933 (1979); Note,
Uniform Commercial Code-Nonapplicability of Payor Bank's "Midnight Deadline" to
Re-Presented Checks, 18 Kan. L. Rev. 679 (1970).
58. The Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita, 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1
(1969), and Goodman v. Norman Bank of Commerce, 551 P.2d 661 (Okla. App. 1976),
cases exempt prompt handling of re-presented check upon reasoning that is flawed
from two directions. First, the Leaderbrand decision in effect applied section 3-511(4)
to a check; the section, which excuses notice of dishonor where a draft has been
previously dishonored by nonacceptance, has absolutely no relevance to a check, and in
any event would be preempted by the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Commercial
Laws. Second, to analyze the problem in terms of the necessity of giving notice
overlooks the requirement of sections 4-301 and 4-302 that the item itself must be
returned unless it is unavailable for return. See text at note 46, supra. The most tell-
ing practical argument against the Leaderbrand analysis is put forth by the Kentucky
court in Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1977):
If a payor bank was not required to meet its midnight deadline with respect to
previously dishonored items, then none of the other banks involved in the collec-
tion process could safely assume that the check had been paid. Consider the prob-
iems of the depository bank. It must permit its customer to withdraw the amount
of the credit given for the check when provisional settlements have become final
by payment and the bank has had "a reasonable time" to learn that the settle-
ment is final. See UCC § 4-213(4)(a). The depository bank will rarely receive notice
that an item has been paid. In actual practice, the depository bank will utilize
availability schedules to compute when it should receive the check if it is to be
returned unpaid. If a payor bank is not bound by its midnight deadline as to
previously dishonored items, then there is no way for the depository bank to
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The midnight deadline is, however, a flexible concept. Affecting
the payor bank's midnight deadline are holidays and other nonbank-
ing days, 9 branch banks, 0 the afternoon cutoff,"' and permissible
delays.2 A recent decision by New York's highest court suggests
that if the midnight deadline is a problem, section 4-301(1) also pro-
vides a means of avoidance. In David Graubart, Inc. v. Bank Leumi
Trust Company,"3 a previously dishonored check was redeposited
and re-presented on a collection basis by direct send to the payor
bank, accompanied by special directions to the payor well under-
stood in banking practice to mean that such a re-represented item
could be held for a reasonable time, even beyond the midnight dead-
line if necessary, to enable funds to come into the drawer's account.
This procedure was categorized by the New York Court of Appeals
as an "agreement," consented to by the depositor, which modified
the effect of the midnight deadline requirement of section 4-302, and
since there was no evidence that the payor bank had held the check
for an unreasonable length of time, no accountability was created by
retention beyond the midnight deadline. 4 An "agreement" it may
have been; whether such an agreement permissibly varies the effect
of the section 4-302 midnight deadline obligation, or impermissibly
know whether a previously dishonored item has been paid upon re-presentment
except by direct communication with the payor bank. Such a procedure would im-
pose an unnecessary burden upon the check collection process.
Id. at 601 (citations omitted). An example of the point made in Blake is seen in
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Akpan, 398 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Civ. Ct. 1977). Whether
or not a payor bank ought to return a re-presented check prior to its midnight dead-
line, the act of the holder in re-presenting a dishonored item could be viewed as a
waiver of the notice of dishonor to which the holder would be entitled as an indorser
under R.S. 10:3-501(2)(a), 3-508(2), and 4-207(2). See Armour & Co. v. Guaranty State
Bank, 253 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-511(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1974).
59. LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(h) (Supp. 1974).
60. LA. R.S. 10:4-106 (Supp. 1974).
61. LA. R.S. 10:4-107 (Supp. 1974).
62. LA. R.S. 10:4-108 (Supp. 1974). Compare Port City State Bank v. American
Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973) (computer "memory error") with Blake v.
Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1977) (machine breakdowns and
employee absences during Christmas holidays) and Sun River Cattle Co. v. Miners
Bank of Montana, 164 Mont. 237, 521 P.2d 679 (1974) (transportation breakdown be-
tween bank and computer processing center).
63. 48 N.Y.2d 554, 399 N.E.2d 930 (1979).
64. The item was also accompanied by an "advice to customer" slip indicating
that, as with collection items generally, credit would only be given to the depositor
upon payment by the payor. The depositor was given a copy of the "advice" slip. Since
no credit existed, the rationale of Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d
588 (Ky. App. 1977), see note 58, supra, is undisturbed by the holding in David
Graubart that the midnight deadline was not applicable to the re-presented check.
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varies the very terms of section 4-302, remains as the real issue of
interest. 5
The postdated check has long been a troublesome item for payor
banks, and despite the fact that the Commercial Laws have clarified
some of the older uncertainties attending its issuance and use,6 the
item remains a maverick to be handled with care. Prior to the
stated date the item cannot be treated as "properly payable" but
must be treated as a variety of conditional checks. 7 To pay prior to
the stated date (the condition) is to pay with the payor bank's own
funds-the prematurely paid postdated check cannot be charged
against the drawer's account.
It should follow that the payor bank is not confronted with the
spectre of accountability if it, in effect, follows its customer's order
by holding the postdated check beyond the normal midnight dead-
line. That method of handling postdated checks can be justified by
simply characterizing the item as a draft, rather than a check, prior
to the stated date; in effect, the postdated check would be a collec-
tion item, rather than a demand item for immediate payment.69 A
65. The Court of Appeals of New York obviously believed that the agreement
only varied the effect of § 4-302; the Appellate Court of Illinois, in a case quite similar
to David Graubart, expressed the contrary belief, although resolving the issue on the
basis that, if the contract did exist, and if it could have permissibly released the bank
from its obligation to return the item prior to the midnight deadline, the agreement in
any event impermissibly attempted to disclaim the bank's obligation of good faith
under sections 4-103(1) and 1-203. Available Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Blue Island, 56 I1. App. 3d 516, 371 N.E.2d 1032 (1977). Section 4-103 is discussed in
Hersbergen, supra note 13.
66. The character of the item as "negotiable" is not affected by the postdating,
LA. R.S. 10:3-114(1) (Supp. 1974), and the fact of postdating does not affect the holder's
ability to achieve holder in due course status. LA. R.S. 10:3-304(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).
67. The stated conclusion is drawn in part from R.S. 10:3-114(2) and in part from
the obvious similarity such terms bear to a conditional check. See Smith v. Maddox-
Rucker Banking Co., 8 Ga. App. 288, 68 S.E. 1092 (1910). Labeling the prematurely
presented postdated check as not properly payable does not truly do harm to payor
banks; under section 4-407 the payor bank often may refuse to recredit the drawer's
account on the basis of the bank's own subrogation rights.
1 68. Smith v. Maddox-Rucker Banking Co., 8 Ga. App. 288, 68 S.E. 1092 (1910). Of
course, the premature charge might well become proper whenever the stated date ar-
rives with no stop payment order in the interim. But the premature depletion of the
drawer's account may well result in the wrongful dishonor of subsequently presented,
and otherwise properly payable items, on the basis of insufficient funds. The Smith
case is an example: two wrongfully dishonored items would have "cleared" if the bank
had not prematurely paid from the account a $140 postdated check. The drawer of a
postdated check simply does not undertake to have the funds to meet it in the
drawer's hand prior to the stated date.
69. A check must, by definition, be "payable on demand." LA. R.S. 10:3-104(2)(b)
(Supp. 1974). Yet, the postdated check is not payable until the stated date. LA. R.S.
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recent federal district court decision from New York declined to
adopt that view, with the result that the payor bank was held
accountable under section 4-302 on a prematurely presented
postdated check held beyond the midnight deadline. In Allied Color
Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company' ° the postdated
check was said, prior to its stated date, not to be a "check" but
rather a "draft"; yet it was characterized as a "demand item"
under section 4-302. The court believed that the label "demand
item" represents a broader category than the label "payable on
demand," and that the postdated check, in effect, is "payable on
demand at a future date." The Allied Color decision requires a
payor bank to handle the postdated check as if it were a routine
demand item: if the item is not properly payable because its
postdate has not arrived, it must be returned unpaid just as a
countermanded check12 is handled.
Regulation J seems to call for a result similar to that in the
Allied Color case, in that payor bank accountability hinges upon
retention of a "cash item" beyond the close of the paying bank's
banking day on which the item was received. 3 The Allied Color case
holds, however, that a postdated check prematurely presented for
payment is not a "cash item." It is difficult to understand how a
postdated check can be other than a "cash item" for purposes of
Regulation J, and yet be a "demand item" for purposes of section
4-302. It is even more difficult to accept the correctness of the Allied
Color decision. Assuming the correctness of the decision, however,
accountability of the payor bank will, in most cases, mean that the
item is thereby made one properly chargeable against the drawer's
account. This is so because accountability cuts off the right of coun-
termand," and because accountability would most likely be the
equivalent of payment for purposes of subrogation rights. 5
10:3-114(2) (Supp. 1974). Courts have occasionally held "bad check" laws inapplicable to
the postdated check on the theory that such items are essentially promissory notes.
70. 484 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
71. See note 69, supra.
72. The holder of a postdated check is not required to present the item for accept-
ance, LA. R.S. 10:3-410 & 3-501(1) (Supp. 1974), but can do so if he desires. But under
R.S. 10:3-503(1)(c), (e), and (2)(a), and 3-114(2), presentment for payment arguably is not
due until the stated date. Accordingly, one could argue that the premature present-
ment for payment of a postdated check is not a timely presentment, and that the item
must be returned as improperly presented.
73. 12 C.F.R. § 210.9(a)(1) (1980).
74. LA. R.S. 10:4-303(1)(e) (Supp. 1974).
75. LA. R.S. 10:4-407 (Supp. 1974). Thus, the ability of the payor bank to assert the
rights of the payee will protect the bank whenever there is no drawer defense against
the payee. To the extent a defense is involved, section 4-407 will usually clothe the
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Banks may understandably desire to avoid the entirety of prob-
lems created by postdated checks and can likely do so by agree-
ment. Thus, the bank may insert into the customer's checking ac-
count agreement a clause stipulating that postdated checks are not
to be drawn at all, and/or if drawn, the drawer will indemnify the
bank for all but negligence-premised liability."6 Alternatively, cor-
respondent banks could agree to handle and present postdated
checks as collection items to be held for collection by the payor bank
for a reasonable time.77
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Charges On Overdraft Items
When a check is presented against insufficient funds in the
drawer's account, the drawee bank may properly pay that item, or it
may properly dishonor it."8 Although there is no apparent uniformity
of approach by drawee banks to the routine handling of the over-
draft item," it is well estabished in Louisiana jurisprudence that the
act of paying an overdraft item is in reality a loan of the overdraft
amount to the customer, the item itself both impliedly requesting
the loan and promising to repay it." But upon what basis may a
payor bank with the holder in due course rights of the depositary bank. Cf. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D.C. Mass. 1958)
(collecting bank a holder in due course). Alternatively, premature payments on
postdated checks may be recoverable as not being "final" payments under R.S. 10:3-418
whenever the party paid is neither a holder in due course, nor has changed his position
in reliance on payment. See Delmar Bank v. Douglas, 366 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App. 1963).
76. Compare Kalish v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 18 Misc. 2d 958, 191 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1959) with Montano v. Springfield Gardens Nat'l Bank, 207 Misc. 840, 140 N.Y.S.2d 63
(App. Term. 1955). The viability of such agreements under R.S. 10:4-103 is discussed in
Hersbergen, supra note 13, at 43-55.
77. See text at notes 63-65, supra.
78. LA. R.S. 10:4-401(1) (Supp. 1974).
79. Compare Orlich v. Rubio Say. Bank, 240 Iowa 1074, 38 N.W.2d 622 (1949), and
First Nat'l Bank of Murfreesboro v. First Nat'l Bank of Nashville, 127 Tenn. 205, 154
S.W. 965 (1912), with Bank of Jeanerette v. Druilhet, 149 La. 505, 89 So. 674 (1921).
Even if a bank has often, or even habitually, paid overdraft items, it is generally held
that no continuing obligation to do so is thereby created in the absence of an express
stipulation to that effect. H. BAILEY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS § 11.1 (4th ed. 1969).
See Modoc Meat & Cattle Co. v. First State Bank of Oregon, 271 Ore. 361, 532 P.2d 21
(1975). It is the drawer that has initiated the circulation of an "NSF" check; he must
bear the ultimate consequences of the handling of the item. City Bank of Honolulu v.
Tenn., 469 P.2d 816 (Hawaii 1970).
80. Caddo Trust & Sav. Bank v. Bush, 182 So. 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). See
Talbot v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 Iowa 361, 76 N.W. 726 (1898). To the extent the over-
draft check represents a consumer, rather than a commercial purpose, the bank
presumably may charge up to the 36% rate ceiling of the Louisiana Consumer Credit
Law. LA. R.S. 9:3419(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 1972 & 1980).
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drawee bank impose a charge when it dishonors an overdraft item?
A persuasive New York decision has recently taken the position
that charging the drawer for handling his dishonored overdraft
items must have a contractual foundation; if not, such charges may
not be imposed.
The drawee bank in Clark v. Marine Midland Bank, Inc.81 had im-
posed a "service" charge of $4 to $5 for each of its customer's
checks not honored because of insufficient or uncollected funds. No
authority for such charges could be found in the checking account
agreement signed by the customer.82 In denying a motion of the
bank to dismiss the customer's action for failure to state a cause of
action, the New York court stated:
[Ilt must be assumed that the agreement between each customer
and defendant was intended to express the whole contract be-
tween the parties. This is the common-sense, everyday under-
standing of a checking account agreement between customer and
bank. Implicit in such an agreement is the promise by the bank
that there would be no penalty or charge imposed upon the
customer with reference to his or her checking account or check-
ing activity other than as specified in the agreement.83
Given the application to the checking account agreement of Civil
Code article 1958, the Clark position almost certainly would be viewed
favorably in Louisiana, at least with respect to noncommercial
customers."
The payee or other holder of a check destined to be returned for
insufficient funds has often transfered the check to a merchant who,
in turn, has deposited the check for collection; very often, the mer-
chant seeks to impose upon the transferor a "returned check"
charge of, for example, $5 or more. Upon the same premise that un-
81. 413 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1979).
82. The action was instituted on behalf of the class of checking account customers
having suffered the imposition of "NSF" charges. Defendants in the suit included
Chase Manhattan Bank and Marine Midland Bank.
83. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
84. Cf. Davis v. Miller Builders & Developers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409, 412 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1976). ("The relationship between ... a depositor and . . . the depository bank,
is that of creditor . . . and debtor . . . . [The depository bank] was not authorized to
debit [the depositor's] account without [his] authority"). Cf. Thomas v. Marine Bank &
Trust Co., 156 La. 941, 101 So. 315 (1924) (setoff must be contractual). The argument
that such charges are "customary" in banking practice would be met by the require-
ment that the commercially sophisticated party must explain such esoteric matters to
the layman. See, e.g., Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976); Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co., Inc., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976);
Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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derlies the Clark decision, such charges may be valid, as a part of
the agreement between the transferor and the merchant. By the act
of giving the check, the transferor can be found to have accepted
the merchant's returned check terms if those terms were clearly
stated, such as in prominently posted notices. Such was the holding
in Merrel v. Research & Data, Inc.85 The merchant's returned check
charge in Merrel-$5, plus 10 percent of the face value on checks of
over $20 in amount-was found to be reasonable, given the unex-
pected bookkeeping involved, but the court did not give blanket ap-
proval to such charges.
The Customer's Duties Under Section 4-406
As a general matter there is no significant difference between
an item bearing a forged necessary indorsement and one that is
missing a necessary indorsement. In either case, the subsequent pos-
sessor of the item cannot be a holder, and the payor bank cannot
properly debit such an item to its drawer-customer's account.8
Under section 4-406, however, the customer is bound only to exer-
cise reasonable care and promptness to examine his account state-
ment and the items the bank has paid to discover his unauthorized
signature (or any alteration on an item);87 he is not obligated to
promptly discover unauthorized indorsements.88 As applied to checks
drawn against sole-signature accounts, and checks issued to sole
payees, section 4-406 has created no controversy. The drawer must
discover and report promptly his unauthorized signature; he has no
obligation to discover and report promptly the unauthorized, or
missing, indorsement of the payee.
85. 3 Kan. App. 2d 48, 589 P.2d 120 (1979).
86. Davis v. Miller Builders & Developers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 361 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1972). It is not the presence of an unauthorized signature, placed on the instru-
ment by someone else, that is significant; rather, it is the absence of a signature by the
party who should have indorsed, that defeats negotiation (and therefore holder status)
and also renders the item not "properly payable." The presence of an unauthorized in-
dorsement on the instrument does have implied warranty consequences under R.S.
10:3-417, 4-207. Additionally, banks handling the missing indorsement item face liability
under R.S. 10:3-419(1). See Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682
(1968).
87. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(1) (Supp. 1974).
88. East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank of Gadsden, 5 Ala. App. 576, 281
So. 2d 431 (1973). Comment 5 to section 4-406 recognizes that there typically is no
reason for drawer examination of indorsements because the drawer will not be familiar
with the payee's signature. The three-year outside limit in section 4-406(4) for assert-
ing unauthorized indorsements recognizes that the drawer will discover such problems
only through notification to him by the payee or other parties. See G & R Corp. v.
American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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A significant disagreement has developed, however, concerning
the application of section 4-406 to checks that are drawn against
multiple-signature accounts but signed by less than all the required
signatories and to checks drawn and issued jointly to multiple
payees, paid by the drawee despite the absence of indorsements by
all such payees. It is a common requirement of the checking account
agreements of entities such as corporations, partnerships, joint ven-
tures, and trust funds, that checks only be paid on two or more spe-
cified signatures. When a check is paid despite the absence of one of
the required signatures, the bank has paid an improperly payable
item and must recredit the entity's account unless it has a defense
thereto. Section 4-406, in sub-sections (1) and (4), provides such a
defense in the case of unauthorized signatures; but is the sole
signature of partner A, on a partnership check that should also have
been signed by partner B, an "unauthorized" signature? If two or
more individual signatures are viewed as necessary to form the sig-
nature of the entity, then the missing individual signature can
render the entity's signature incomplete and, for that reason, unau-
thorized89 within the meaning of section 4-406(1) and (4)9 ° But, con-
89. R.S. 10:1-201 defines an "unauthorized" signature or indorsement as "one
made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery."
90. The stated view was taken by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Pine Bluff
Nat'l Bank v. Kesterson, 520 S.W.2d 253 (Ark. 1975), a case involving a trust fund
drawer whose "authorized" signature was to consist of the joint signatures of three
trustees. The court took the view that any purported signature of the trust fund not
consisting of all three signatures was an unauthorized signature, even though the one
or two individual signatures themselves were authorized and proper. Two courts do
not agree with the Arkansas decision. In Wolfe v. University Nat'l Bank, 270 Md. 70,
310 A.2d 558 (1973), section 4-406(1) was held inapplicable to partnership checks bear-
ing only one of two required partner's signatures, the court focusing primarily on the
fact that the checks bore no unauthorized individual signatures, ie., the only signatory
was in fact an authorized signatory. That approach was expressly repudiated by the
Arkansas court. But the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1975) agreed
with the view of the Maryland court in Wolfe that the absence of one of two or more
required signatures does not constitute the unauthorized signature of an entity under
section 4-406. The decision, which involved a joint venture checking account, conceded
the plausibility of the Arkansas court's approach to section 4-406, but concluded that
section 4-406 was not intended to place the responsibility for discovery of the missing
individual signature on the drawer, in view of the ease with which the bank could pro-
tect itself by consulting the signature card. That point is a valid one, but not a telling
one. Drawee banks will probably not be successful in the entity-drawer cases-even in
Arkansas-under section 4-406(1), because under section 4-406(3) it would seem rather
easy for the entity to establish the bank's lack of ordinary care in paying such an item
without consulting the signature card; in such a case, the preclusion defense of subsec-
tions (1) and (2) is not available to the bank. Subsection (4), however, expressly oper-
ates independently of subsections (1), (2), and (3); that is, even the negligent bank can
raise the one-year bar against a non-negligent customer. For that reason, the focus of
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ceding such to be a valid analysis of section 4-406, it does not follow
that the drawer must, either promptly or within three years,
discover and report a missing joint-payee signature;9 such is, how-
ever, the recent holding of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Trust
Company Bank v. Atlanta IBM Employees Federal Credit Union."
Other U.C.C. decisions and pre-Commercial Laws decisions in Louis-
iana do not agree with the Georgia case. 3
RASCALITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF DRAWER NEGLIGENCE
Checks in payment of insurance claims are often issued by the
insurer-drawer payable jointly to the insured-claimant and the re-
pairman-a perfectly acceptable custom, but one fraught with ras-
cality potential. For instance, the drawer cannot deliver the joint-
payee check to both payees, an important consideration in light of
the requirement that both joint payees must indorse in order to ne-
gotiate the instrument. 4 According to the fourth circuit decision in
Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Insurance Company," the drawer
must be greatly concerned about the possibility that the recipient-
these cases must be on subsection (4), and in that respect, the Arkansas view seems
preferable.
91. No case has suggested that a drawer must discover and report the missing in-
dorsement of a sole payee, and traditionally that has been the burden of the collecting
and paying banks. See Davis v. Miller Builders & Developers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976); Trouard v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles, 247 So. 2d 607 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971); Allan Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Shreveport, 2 So. 2d
76 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
92. 264 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1980). The decision applies section 4-406(4) to a check miss-
ing one of two joint-payee indorsements.
93. In Davis v. Miller Builders & Developers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409, 412 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1976), for example, the court said of the payment of a check not indorsed by
the sole payee:
It is the duty of the drawee bank to require indorsement by the payee before
paying a check. The drawer may assume that the drawee paid upon a proper in-
dorsement and in the absence of gross negligence on the drawer's part, the
drawer is under no duty to discover that payment was made without proper in-
dorsement.
And in Trouard v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles, 247 So. 2d 607, 610-11 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971), it was said of a check bearing a forged payee indorsement: "it was the
duty of the banks involved, including the drawee bank .... to require the endorse-
ment of the named payee prior to payment [and] the drawer . . . has no duty to
discover that payment was made upon an improper endr-sement .. " Two U.C.C.
decisions have held § 4-406(4) inapplicable to the check missing a signature of one of
the joint payees. Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Davis, 126 N.J. Super. 379, 314 A.2d 615 (1974);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 361 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1972). Both decisions reason that section 4-406(4) should not bar drawer redress where
there is so patent a breach of the payor bank's contractual obligation.
94. LA. R.S. 10:3-116 & 3-202 (Supp. 1974).
95. 374 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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payee will forge the indorsement of the nonrecipient-payee. In
Koerner & Lambert a joint payee draft was sent by the insurer-
drawer to the payee-repairman upon whose estimate of cost to
repair the payee-insured's boat the draft had been issued. The
drawer did not notify its payee-insured that the draft had been is-
sued as a joint payee instrument and had been sent to the repair-
man. This oversight became significant when the repairman did not
perform the repairs, but did transfer the draft to his lawyer for the
purpose of payments to his creditors. The lawyer deposited the
draft for collection, disbursing funds to creditors of his repairman-
client only when the draft had been paid by the drawee. The drawer
ultimately discovered that its insured had received neither repairs
nor payment of the claim and demanded, on the basis of the payee-
insured's affidavit as to the forgery of his signature, that the
drawee recredit its account. The drawee did so, and in turn demanded
and received reimbursement from the depositary bank," which in
turn debited the lawyer's account. 7 The lawyer sued the drawer-
insurer.
The fourth circuit held that the drawer's issuance of a joint-
payee check to the repairman without notification to its insured-
claimant was negligence, which under R.S. 10:3-406 estopped the
drawer from claiming in the lawyer's suit against it that the lawyer
had breached the implied warranty of good title made by one who
obtains payment. Assuming the validity of the court's resolution of
the negligence issue, the court reached a defensible result by the
wrong route.
For the predictable but unpreventable case of rascality
presented by Koerner & Lambert, the Louisiana Commercial Laws
provide a scheme by which the inevitable losses are distributed.
When the instrument has not been finally paid, the losses are usually
distributed pursuant to the provisions of the Commercial Laws per-
taining to the liability on the instrument of drawers and indorsers"
and those pertaining to the implied warranties of transferors. 0
Koerner & Lambert involved an item that had been paid, and for
96. See LA. R.S. 10:4-207(1)(a) (Supp. 1974).
97. See LA. R.S. 10:4-207(2)(a) (Supp. 1974). The case actually involved two drafts
issued to two different claimants, each of whom dealt with the same nonperforming re-
pairman.
98. LA. R.S. 10:2-417(1) (Supp. 1974).
99. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) & 3-414 (Supp. 1974).
100. Transferors outside of bank channels make implied warranties under R.S.
10:3-417(2), but the depositor (usually the holder or owner of the item) and collecting
banks make implied warranties under R.S. 10:4-207(2). The two subsections are
substantially identical.
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such cases other provisions of the Commercial Laws come into play,
most notably those pertaining to the implied warranties made by
those who obtain payment,"' and to the rights of the "true owner"
of the instrument.' 2 Additionally, in forged indorsement cases there
exists a creditor (typically the payee) who can claim the undischarged
underlying obligation1"3 of the drawer or other debtor.
In Koerner & Lambert the payee-claimant had a contractual
right to be paid on his claim, and because payment was not made to
him or for his benefit, he had an undisputable claim against the
drawer. The drawer, in turn, had a legitimate complaint against the
drawee because the draft was not paid upon the authorized signa-
ture of both payees.' Drawees, however, are protected under R.S.
10:3-406 from claims for reimbursement where, although they have
paid the instrument over an unauthorized indorsement, the neg-
ligence of the party claiming reimbursement "substantially con-
tributes" to the making of the unauthorized indorsement. Given the
Koerner & Lambert holding on the issue of the drawer's negligence,
the drawee could-and should-have defended the drawer's reim-
bursement claim; had it done so, the controversy would have been
quickly resolved by leaving the loss with the drawer.0 0 Drawees
who cannot defend the drawer's claim for reimbursement are pro-
tected by the implied warranties made by the party obtaining the
(mistaken) payment or from the collecting banks which forwarded
the item paid."°'
The policy question indirectly raised in Koerner & Lambert is
whether a drawee should be able to claim implied warranty protec-
tion after it has foregone or waived its rights under section 3-406 as
101. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(1) & 4-207(1) (Supp. 1974).
102. LA. R.S. 10:3-419(1) (Supp. 1974). See Smith v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 75 Ill.
App. 3d 971, 394 N.E.2d 804 (1979).
103. The underlying obligation is typically discharged only by a payment of the in-
strument issued to the creditor; but payment will create a discharge defense for the
drawer, maker, or other debtor only when the holder receives the payment. LA. R.S.
10:3-603 (Supp. 1974). When a necessary indorsement has been forged, there can be no
subsequent holder of the instrument, LA. R.S. 10:3-202(1), (2) (Supp. 1974), and conse-
quently, no discharge by payment.
104. LA. R.S. 10:3-116(b) & 4-401(1) (Supp. 1974).
105. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Constitution Nat'l Bank, 167
Conn. 478, 356 A.2d 117 (1975); Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill.
App. 2d 235, 207 N.E.2d 158 (1965); Thompson Maple Prods., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank
of Corry, 234 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. 1967). But see Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Chemical Bank, 47 A.D.2d 608, 363 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1975); Society Nat'l Bank of
Cleveland v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 281 N.E.2d 563 (1972). See also
Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974).
106. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(1) & 4-207(1) (Supp. 1974).
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against the drawer. Courts might predictably estop the drawee from
subsequently claiming warranty protection in such a case,17 but even
if the drawee in Koerner & Lambert could have legitimately claimed
its implied warranty protection against the depositary bank, and
that bank in turn have debited (by setoff) the lawyer's account, 1° the
lawyer would thereby have had no warranty claims against the
drawer, ' and he would not be the "true owner" for purposes of sec-
tion 3-419(1);1 ° only if he could obtain possession of it could he sue
the drawer "on the instrument." ' Because a drawer only engages to
pay the holder or an indorser who takes up the instrument, 2 the
lawyer would have to prove his holder status-a difficult task given
the existence of the forged indorsement-and while section 3-406 is
a great comfort to a "drawee or other payor," it is not of great
assistance to one not a holder in due course. Contrary to the holding
of the Koerner & Lambert case, the lawyer-plaintiff was not a
holder in due course, who is therefore protected by section 3-406; in
fact, he was not even a holder. Overlooked by the fourth circuit in
Koerner & Lambert is the inherent circuity of thought in section
3-406: an unauthorized indorsement may not be asserted by a
107. R.S. 10:4-406(5) provides that "if under this section" a payor bank has a valid
defense against the customer's claim of wrongful payment, but waives or fails upon re-
quest (of the owner of the item or one of the collecting banks involved, presumably) to
assert the defense, then the payor bank "may not assert against any collecting bank or
other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the
unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim." The language
"under this section" clearly precludes direct application of subsection (5) to the case in
which a payor bank has only a section 3-406 defense against the drawer's claim. One
court, however, has applied the same principle to the section 3-406 cases, perhaps as a
matter of equitable estoppel under section 1-103 (R.S. 10:1-103). Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank, 64 Misc. 2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1970).
Cf. Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978)
(drawer action against collecting bank). But see East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l
Bank of Gadsden, 281 So. 2d 431 (Ala. App. 1973).
108. Depositors of items make both implied warranties and an engagement to "take
up" the item upon dishonor. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(2) (Supp. 1974).
109. Drawer did not "transfer" the item within the meaning of R.S. 10:3-417(2), and
drawers make no warranties under section 3-417(1).
110. Although "owner" and "holder" are closely related terms in the Commercial
Laws, they are not identical; still, a "trueowner" who is not the holder and is not
otherwise entitled to payment, does not benefit from R.S. 10:3-419(1). By contrast, the
payee-insured, who never had possession of the instrument, is not necessarily to be
regarded as its true owner. See Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.
App. 1976). But see Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 529 P.2d 903 (Ore. 1974)
(permitting a section 3-419 action by a non-indorsing co-payee).
111. LA. R.S. 10:3-301 (Supp. 1974).
112. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) (Supp. 1974).
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negligent party against a holder in due course, which the plaintiff
could not be if the indorsement was unauthorized."1
Unlike sections 3-419(1), 3-413, 3-414, 3-417, and 4-207, section
3-406 does not yield a basis for a plaintiffs suit against the negligent
party; rather, it merely describes a preclusion device designed to
prevent the assertion of the truth in circumstances in which it
would be highly unfair for the truth to be heard. Section 3-406 does
not permit one party to sue another party upon a claim of injury or
loss caused by a negligent act; such an action is not prohibited by
the Commercial Laws, but is unrelated to section 3-406.' The most
significant aspect of Koerner & Lambert is not, however, the possi-
ble misunderstanding of section 3-406, but the matter of what con-
stitutes negligence under that section. If the fourth circuit is correct
on the negligence issue, the issuance of joint-payee checks will re-
quire reexamination.
113. Most aspects of section 3-406 are without ambiguity. A drawee can be pro-
tected in alteration cases and in cases involving unauthorized signatures of either the
drawer or of the payee and subsequent holders. Likewise, one can be a holder-and
therefore a holder in due course-of an instrument that has been altered or bears an
unauthorized drawer or maker's signature, LA. R.S. 10:3-404(1) (Supp. 1974), and he can
obviously use the shelter of section 3-406. But once there is an unauthorized necessary
indorsement, only a drawee or other payor can logically qualify for the section 3-406
protection.
The circuity may be more apparent than real. Holders will typically allege that they
are holders in due course, though such need not be proven until it is shown that a
defense exists. LA. R.S. 10:3-307(3) (Supp. 1974). Where the instrument is in negotiable
form, and the defendant does not raise the requirements of section 3-302, it appears
that the courts are either assuming holder in due course status for purposes of the sec-
tion 3-406 issue, or are simply applying equitable estoppel via section 1-103 to preclude
the negligent party from raising the harsh truth that without the necessary authorized
signature, plaintiff cannot be a holder in due course. If defendant is precluded from
raising the only possible infirmity in the plaintiff's status, the allegation that he is a
holder in due course will be uncontroverted. An example of the application of equitable
estoppel to an unauthorized indorser's signature is found in Gluckman v. Darling, 85
N.J.L. 457, 89 A. 1016 (1914).
114. See LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974).
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